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Abstract 
The emerging principle of a “responsibility to protect” (R2P) presents a direct challenge to China‟s 
traditional emphasis on the twin principles of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other states and non-
use of military force. This paper considers the evolution of China‟s relationship with R2P over the past ten 
years. In particular, it examines how China engaged with R2P during the recent Libyan crisis, and considers 
what impact this conflict may have first, on Chinese attitudes to R2P, and second, on the future development 
and implementation of the doctrine itself. This paper argues that China‟s decision to allow the passage of 
Security Council resolution 1973, authorising force in Libya, was shaped by an unusual set of political and 
factual circumstances, and should not be viewed as evidence of a dramatic shift in Chinese attitudes towards 
R2P.  More broadly, controversy over the scope of NATO‟s military action in Libya has raised questions 
about R2P‟s legitimacy, which have contributed to a lack of timely international action in Syria. In the short 
term at least, this post-Libya backlash against R2P is likely to constrain the Security Council‟s ability to 
respond decisively to other civilian protection situations.   
 
 
On 17 March 2011, almost a decade after the International Commission on Intervention and 
State Sovereignty (ICISS) 
 
outlined the original notion of a “responsibility to protect” (R2P),1 the 
UN Security Council passed resolution 1973 authorising the use of military force against the 
Libyan regime.
2
  This historic resolution - the first in which the UN has authorised the use of 
force for civilian protection purposes without the consent of the “host” state – came as something 
of a surprise. Many commentators had expected China and Russia to veto any proposal for 
military action.
3
  While supporters of R2P immediately hailed resolution 1973 as a significant 
step towards the consolidation of R2P‟s status as a new international norm, political consensus 
on civilian protection in Libya quickly dissolved as disagreements emerged within the Security 
                                               
*BA, LLB (Hons) (Qld), LLM (Cantab). Associate Lecturer, Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, 
Australia.  This article was finished in December 2011. Subsequent developments up to 27 March 2012 have, as far 
as possible, been included. 
1 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), “The Responsibility to Protect: Report of 
the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty” (2001), online: ICISS 
<http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf>. 
2 See SC Res. 1973, UN Doc. S/RES/1973 (2011). 
3
 See, for example, Alex J. BELLAMY and Paul WILLIAMS, “The new politics of protection? Cote d‟Ivoire, Libya 
and the responsibility to protect” (2011) 87 International Affairs 825 at 840; Ramesh THAKUR, “Libya: The First 
Stand or the Last Post for the Responsibility to Protect?” e-International Relations (13 March 2011), online: e-
International Relations <http://www.e-ir.info/?p=7646>.; Andrew GARWOOD-GOWERS, “Libya and the 
international community‟s „responsibility to protect‟” Online Opinion (25 February 2011), online: Online Opinion 
<http://www.onlineopinion.com.au/view.asp?article=11676>. 
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Council over the scope of military action permitted by the resolution.
4
  Long-standing fears 
among China and other non-Western states that R2P could be used as a pretext for regime 
change returned to the fore as the legitimacy of NATO‟s military action in Libya was called into 
question.  This “blow-back” effect from Libya has been evident in the international community‟s 
subsequent inability to reach consensus over civilian protection issues in Syria.
5
 These 
developments raise important questions as to whether the Libyan intervention will consolidate 
R2P‟s normative status or lead to a weakening of support for the principle. 
 
As a veto-holding permanent member of the Security Council, China plays a vital role in 
decisions relating to international peace and security, including those involving civilian 
protection and R2P. However, R2P presents a direct challenge to China‟s traditional foreign 
policy emphasis on the twin principles of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other states 
and non-use of military force.
6
  Despite moving from initial criticism of R2P towards cautious 
endorsement of a conservative interpretation of the concept, China has remained uncomfortable 
with R2P‟s potential to lead to non-consensual military intervention.7  In that respect, at first 
glance China‟s decision not to block resolution 1973 might appear to indicate a departure from 
its traditional foreign policy principles.  Closer inspection of the Libyan crisis, however, reveals 
a more complex set of factors at play. 
 
This paper explores the evolution of China‟s relationship with R2P over the past ten 
years. In particular, it examines how China engaged with R2P in the recent Libyan crisis, and 
what impact this conflict may have first, on Chinese attitudes to R2P, and second, on the future 
development and implementation of the principle itself. It argues that China‟s decision to allow 
the passage of resolution 1973 was shaped by an unusual set of political and factual 
considerations, and should not be interpreted as evidence of a dramatic shift in Chinese attitudes 
towards R2P.  More broadly, concerns over the way military force has been used in Libya have 
caused a backlash against R2P, which has undermined the international community‟s ability to 
                                               
4 Thomas G. WEISS, “RtoP Alive and Well after Libya” (2011) 25 Ethics and International Affairs 1 at 1. 
5
 See part V of this article for discussion of the Chinese and Russian vetoes of two draft Security Council resolutions 
relating to Syria on 4 October 2011 and 4 February 2012 respectively. 
6 See Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, 1 U.N.T.S. XVI (entered into force 24 October 1945) [UN 
Charter]. The principle of non-intervention is contained in Art 2(7). The prohibition on the use of force is contained 
in Art 2(4).  
7 For discussion of the evolution of China‟s position on R2P see part II of this article. 
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respond to other civilian protection crises connected to the so-called “Arab Spring”.  This 
suggests that the Libyan intervention may, in the short term at least, lead to a softening of R2P‟s 
normative status.   
 
I. R2P AND ITS EVOLUTION 
A. R2P as a Concept 
 
The concept of R2P evolved out of dismay at the international community‟s failure to prevent 
mass atrocity crimes in Rwanda and elsewhere in the 1990s.  It represents a re-conceptualization 
of the relationship between state sovereignty and human rights, in which sovereignty is viewed 
“not as an absolute term of authority but as a kind of responsibility”.8  In the original 2001 ICISS 
report, R2P was conceived as having three elements: the responsibility to prevent a population 
from suffering serious harm, the responsibility to react if such harm occurs, and the 
responsibility to rebuild after an intervention.
9
  While the primary responsibility to protect lay 
with the host state, if that state perpetrated “serious harm” to a population, or was unwilling or 
unable to stop such violence, the international community assumed a responsibility to protect.
10
  
“Serious harm” was defined as actual or imminent “large scale of life” or “large scale ethnic 
cleansing‟”.11 Military intervention for humanitarian purposes was envisaged as an exceptional 
measure which should be considered in the light of six criteria: just cause, right intention, last 
resort, right authority, proportional means, and reasonable prospects of success.
12
  Although the 
ICISS report designated the Security Council as the most appropriate body for authorising 
military action for human protection purposes, it suggested that the General Assembly and 
regional or sub-regional organisations might provide alternative mechanisms for authorising 
force if the Security Council was dead-locked.
13
 
 
In its current form, as distinct from the earlier 2001 conception, R2P consists of three 
mutually reinforcing pillars derived from the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, and 
                                               
8 Ramesh THAKUR, The United Nations, Peace and Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) at 
251. 
9 ICISS, supra note 1 at xi. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid., at xii. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid., at xiii. 
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subsequently outlined in the UN Secretary-General‟s 2009 report, Implementing the 
Responsibility to Protect.
14
  The first is that states have an obligation to protect their populations 
from mass atrocity crimes (genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against 
humanity).
15
  The second pillar stipulates that the international community should assist states in 
fulfilling their pillar one obligations.  Where states are “manifestly failing” to protect their 
populations the third pillar provides that the international community has a responsibility to 
respond in a “timely and decisive manner”.16  Action under the third pillar can include non-
coercive means such as diplomacy and humanitarian assistance, and, as a last resort, coercive 
measures involving the use of force.   
 
It is generally recognised that R2P is based on existing principles of international law and 
does not add anything new in the way of legal duties.
17
  R2P can be seen primarily as a political 
or moral commitment to implementing established (pillar one and two) duties created in treaty 
law and customary international law.
18
  Contrary to the original ICISS report, the current notion 
of military action under R2P‟s third pillar is permitted only in accordance with existing UN 
Charter Chapter VII procedures governing the Security Council‟s authorisation of the use of 
force.  Military intervention is a course of action that is available to the Security Council in 
circumstances where states are “manifestly failing” to protect their populations.  The third pillar 
is yet to reach the status of a legal duty requiring positive action to protect civilians against mass 
atrocity crimes, although with the evolution of state practice in the future it may crystallise into 
                                               
14 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, GA Res. 60/1, UN Doc. A/RES/60/1 (2005), at paras 138, 139; 
Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc A/63/677 (2009).  
15 For discussion of the legal definitions of the four crimes see David SCHEFFER, “Atrocity Crimes Framing the 
Responsibility to Protect” (2009) 40 Case Western Journal of International Law 111. 
16 World Summit Outcome Document, supra note 14 at para. 139.    
17 See for example, Alex J. BELLAMY and Ruben REIKE, “The Responsibility to Protect and International Law” 
(2010) 2 Global Responsibility to Protect 267; Carsten STAHN, “Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or 
Emerging Legal Norm?” (2007) 101 American Journal of International Law 99.  Note that Orford argues that R2P 
“should be understood as normative in the former sense of providing legal authorisation for certain kinds of 
activities.”  However, this is a claim that R2P confers legal powers, rather than an assertion that it imposes legal 
duties.  See Anne ORFORD, “From Promise to Practice? The Legal Significance of the Responsibility to Protect 
Concept” (2011) 3 Global Responsibility to Protect 400 at 421. 
18 For example, the Genocide Convention has been interpreted by the International Court of Justice as imposing a 
legal duty on a state to take peaceful measures to prevent genocide in circumstances where that state has relevant 
information and capacity to take such steps. See Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro) Judgment of 26 
February 2007, [2007] I.C.J. Rep. 43. 
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such a duty.
19
 At present, however, the international community‟s “responsibility” to respond to 
such circumstances exists only on a political or moral level. 
 
B. R2P’s Evolution 
In historical terms R2P‟s reception into the international system has been rapid, though aspects 
of the concept remain contested.  The most controversial element has been the military force 
dimension. From the outset, China and other non-Western states were suspicious of this 
component of the new principle, fearing that it might be used as a tool of Western imperialism.
20
  
Conscious of the need to assuage such fears and build support for R2P, UN officials adopted a 
diplomatic strategy of emphasising the more palatable elements of the concept – namely, 
prevention and state assistance.  This approach, coupled with R2P sceptics‟ ongoing resistance to 
the military dimension of R2P, led to several modifications of the original ICISS conception of 
R2P.  First, the military force dimension was placed exclusively under Security Council control, 
closing off the ICISS‟s suggestion that alternative authorisation mechanisms might be utilised if 
the Security Council was unable to agree.  Second, the ICISS‟s criteria for determining the 
appropriateness of military intervention for humanitarian purposes were removed.  Third, the 
types of violence covered by R2P were limited to the four mass atrocity crimes, rather than the 
previous, less precise term “large scale loss of life”. Finally, the threshold triggering the 
international community‟s responsibility was raised from a host state being “unwilling or 
unable” to halt violence, to the more onerous standard of “manifestly failing”.  As a result of 
these changes, the conception of R2P that was unanimously adopted by UN member states at the 
2005 World Summit was a softer, less concrete version of the norm initially formulated by the 
ICISS.
21
  Under “R2P-lite”, as Weiss labelled it, military intervention in extreme cases remained 
                                               
19 Bellamy and Reike, supra note 17 at 284-85. 
20 In ICISS Roundtable discussions in June 2001 China stated that “[i]t is clear that certain Western powers have 
played with noble principles to serve their own hegemonic interests”. See International Commission on Intervention 
and State Sovereignty (ICISS), “The Responsibility to Protect: Research, Bibliography, Background – 
Supplementary Volume to the Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty” 
(2001), online: International Development Research Centre  <http://web.idrc.ca/openebooks/963-1/>, 392. 
21 World Summit Outcome Document, supra note 14 at para. 139. For discussion of this shift along the normative 
continuum see Jochen PRANTL and Ryoko NAKANO, “Global Norm Diffusion in East Asia: How China and 
Japan Implement the Responsibility to Protect” (2011) 25 International Relations 204 at 209. 
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an option, but there was now no guidance as to when the Security Council should authorise such 
action.
22
    
 
Since 2005 discussion of R2P within the UN system has continued to centre on the less 
controversial aspects of preventive action and state capacity building under pillars one and two. 
Despite lingering resistance to R2P from some states, including China, this cautious approach 
eventually led to consensus within the Security Council on resolution 1674 (28 April 2006), 
which “reaffirmed” the World Summit‟s commitments on R2P.23  The first mention of R2P in 
relation to a specific crisis occurred later in 2006 with Security Council resolution 1706 on the 
situation in Darfur.
24
 In 2008 the preventive component of the concept played a significant role 
in framing the international community‟s response to post-election violence in Kenya, while a 
further resolution (1894, 2009)
25
 provided additional endorsement of R2P in general terms.
26
 
However, throughout this period ongoing resistance to implementing R2P meant that specific 
references to the principle were not included in further Security Council resolutions on other 
crises.  Instead, attention shifted from the Security Council to the General Assembly, where 
broader discussion of R2P could be undertaken by all UN member states. This culminated in the 
2009 General Assembly debate, in which states overwhelmingly supported Secretary-General 
Ban Ki-Moon‟s report outlining the three pillars of R2P.27  Although this outcome appeared to 
vindicate the Secretary General‟s diplomatic approach, his strategy of emphasising the 
preventive aspects of R2P meant that contentious issues surrounding military intervention 
remained unresolved.
28
 This indeterminacy in pillar three enabled virtually all states to pledge 
support for R2P at a rhetorical level but it also papered over significant cracks between Western 
and non-Western states‟ interpretations of how R2P‟s military dimension should be 
operationalized.  As discussed in part III, while the unusually explicit nature of the threat to 
                                               
22 Thomas G. WEISS, “R2P after 9/11 and the World Summit” (2006) 24 Wisconsin International Law Journal 741 
at 750. 
23 SC Res. 1674, UN Doc. S/RES/1674 (2006). 
24 SC Res. 1706, UN Doc. S/RES/1706 (2006). 
25 SC Res. 1894, UN Doc. S/RES/1894 (2009). 
26 On the Kenyan situation see Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, “The Responsibility to Protect and 
Kenya: Past Successes and Current Challenges” (13 August 2010), online: Global Centre for the Responsibility to 
Protect 
<http://globalr2p.org/media/pdf/The_Responsibility_to_Protect_and_Kenya_Past_Successes_and_Current_Challeng
es.pdf.>. 
27 See UN Docs. A/63/PV.97; A/63/PV.98; A/63/PV.99; A/63/PV.100; A/63/PV.101 (2009). 
28 On criticism of the Secretary-General‟s diplomatic strategy see Jennifer WELSH, “Civilian Protection in Libya: 
Putting Coercion and Controversy Back into RtoP” (2011) 25 Ethics and International Affairs 1 at 7. 
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civilians in the Libyan crisis meant that these differences were temporarily put to one side when 
resolution 1973 was passed, they quickly re-emerged once NATO‟s military campaign began. 
 
II. CHINA AND R2P PRIOR TO THE LIBYAN CRISIS 
 
China‟s relationship with R2P has passed through a number of phases. After initially criticising 
the concept China has since participated in the process of articulating and refining R2P. Its role 
in subtly influencing, and gradually acquiescing to the development of the softer, less concrete 
R2P doctrine that has evolved since 2001 has been described as “neither [that of] a norm-taker, 
nor norm-maker, but something in between”.29  The following section briefly outlines the history 
of China‟s relationship with R2P prior to the civilian protection crisis in Libya. 
 
Traditionally China has insisted on a rigid conception of state sovereignty, which has 
manifested itself both in sensitivity to outside interference in Chinese affairs, and in an historical 
reluctance to engage with international political and humanitarian crises.
30
 In relation to the 
latter, Chinese foreign policy rhetoric since the 1950s has emphasised the twin principles of non-
intervention in the domestic affairs of other states and non-use of military force.
31
  Both of these 
are directly challenged by R2P‟s reconceptualization of sovereignty. As the original ICISS report 
outlined, when a state is unwilling or unable to halt or avert serious harm to civilians “the 
principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect”.32 In R2P‟s 
current form this is reflected in pillars two and three, which envisage significant, potentially 
coercive, intrusion into a state‟s internal affairs.33  
 
Given this incongruence between the normative basis of R2P and China‟s traditional 
adherence to a classical understanding of state sovereignty and non-intervention, initial Chinese 
                                               
29 Rosemary FOOT, “The Responsibility to Protect and Its Evolution: Beijing's Influence on 
Norm Creation in Humanitarian Areas” (2010) St Antony's International Review 47 at 59. 
30 For detailed discussion see Zhongying PANG, “China‟s Non-Intervention Question” (2009) 1 Global 
Responsibility to Protect 237; Jonathan E. DAVIS, “From Ideology to Pragmatism: China‟s Position on 
Humanitarian Intervention in the Post-Cold War Era” (2011) 44 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 217 at 
224-27. 
31 These two principles form part of China‟s “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence”, which are enshrined in the 
preamble to the Chinese Constitution. See Constitution of the People’s Republic of China. 
32 ICISS, supra note 1 at 8. 
33 Welsh notes that the less controversial aspects of prevention and state assistance also entail intrusion on state 
sovereignty, albeit in a less dramatic form than military intervention. See Welsh, supra note 28 at 7. 
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resistance to R2P was unsurprising.  During the ICISS Roundtable consultations prior to the 
release of the 2001 report, China explicitly rejected the notion of coercive intervention without 
the consent of the host state.
34
 China‟s concerns about R2P were based primarily on its 
perception that the concept could be used to justify Western military intervention in non-
democratic states.  Following the release of the ICISS report, China continued to express 
misgivings about R2P, particularly in relation to the suggestion that the General Assembly or 
regional organisations might offer alternative mechanisms for authorising military action for 
civilian protection purposes.  China insisted that “[a]ny response to [a humanitarian] crisis 
should strictly conform to the UN Charter” and „that it falls on the Security Council to make the 
decision”.35  This narrow interpretation was intended to ensure that China would retain the power 
to block any R2P action by wielding its Security Council veto.  Insistence by China and other 
states on exclusive Security Council control over the sharp edge of R2P led to such a provision 
being included in the 2005 World Summit Outcome document.
36
   This crucial modification 
enabled China to endorse R2P in that document. 
 
Despite endorsing R2P at the World Summit in 2005 China remained cautious about 
R2P. It adopted a strategy of “norm containment” in which it continued to downplay the link 
between R2P and non-consensual military intervention.
37
  China also resisted efforts by UN 
officials to elaborate and refine the concept of R2P, insisting that resolution 1674 (2006) be 
limited to a reaffirmation of the key paragraphs of the World Summit document.  In line with this 
strategy of containment, China emphasised the preventive dimension of R2P and stressed the 
pillar one requirement that the primary responsibility to protect lies with the state concerned.  At 
the same time, however, China acknowledged that the international community has a 
responsibility to respond to humanitarian crises. Though it continued to insist that any 
international action should be carried out with state consent in accordance with R2P‟s second 
pillar, China‟s acknowledgement of the need for external intervention represented a softening of 
                                               
34 ICISS, supra note 20 at 392. 
35
 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People‟s Republic of China, “Position Paper of the People‟s Republic of China 
on the United Nations Reforms”, (7 June 2005), online: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People‟s Republic of 
China <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t199318.htm>. 
36 Paragraph 139 of the World Summit Outcome Document, supra note 14, refers to “collective action...through the 
Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII...”. 
37 Prantl and Nakano, supra note 21 at 214. 
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its traditional rigid interpretation of the principle of non-intervention.
38
  China‟s overall position 
towards R2P since 2005 has been described as “preserv[ing] the vestiges of its once firm stance 
on non-interference – the requirement for host state consent for collective military deployment – 
without appearing to completely turn a blind eye to mass atrocities”.39     
 
The impact of China‟s apparent shift towards a partial accommodation of R2P should not, 
however, be over-stated.  Cautious rhetorical backing for R2P as a general concept did not 
always translate into Chinese support for international action in specific cases of human rights 
abuses. First, China abstained on resolution 1706 (2006) on Darfur, in which R2P was mentioned 
for the first time in a country-specific resolution.  Second, China (and Russia) vetoed 
international sanctions against Myanmar (2007) and Zimbabwe (2008).
40
  Interestingly, however, 
in these cases China did not justify its opposition to international action by reference to 
sovereignty and non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states; instead it emphasised that 
conflict resolution through political dialogue, rather than Security Council enforcement action, 
was the better means of achieving civilian protection.
41
  China also stressed that its views on 
these country-specific issues were consistent with the positions of relevant regional organisations 
and other regional powers.
42
  In these cases, pragmatism, rather than ideology, appeared to be the 
principal factor influencing China‟s stance on international action for civilian protection 
purposes. 
 
China‟s shift towards a more flexible interpretation of state sovereignty that is capable of 
accommodating most aspects of R2P has been attributed to a number of factors.  The first is the 
impact of socialisation within institutional settings at the international level.
43
  China‟s growing 
participation in multi-lateral fora and negotiating processes – including those concerned with the 
articulation of R2P – has led to greater scrutiny of Chinese foreign policy and has increased the 
reputational costs of action which is perceived as obstructing international efforts at civilian 
                                               
38 Ibid., at 213. 
39 Sarah TEITT, “The Responsibility to Protect and China‟s Peacekeeping Policy” (2011) 18 International 
Peacekeeping 298 at 304. 
40
 See UN Doc S/PV.5619 (2007) on Myanmar; UN Doc S/PV.5933 (2008) on Zimbabwe. 
41 Teitt, supra note 39 at 309. 
42 Yun SUN, “China‟s Acquiescence on UNSCR 1973 – No Big Deal” International Relations and Security Network 
(ISN), online: International Relations and Security Network <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/ISN-
Insights/Detail?lng=en&id=128200&contextid734=128200&contextid735=128197&tabid=128197>. 
43 Foot, supra note 29 at 60.  
10 
 
protection.  This was particularly evident in heavy criticism in 2007 of China‟s position on the 
situation in Darfur.
44
  As a result of such criticism China is now “much more concerned about 
national image” and “attach[es] more importance to soft power”.45  These image-related 
considerations have contributed to a gradual softening of the Chinese position on R2P.
46
  Second, 
the expansion of China‟s overseas business interests has necessitated a more outward-looking 
foreign policy that is prepared to consider intervening in other states‟ internal affairs in order to 
safeguard or promote Chinese interests.
47
  This has made it more difficult for China to insist on a 
rigid conception of state sovereignty and non-interference.  Third, and closely linked to the first 
two factors, is the impact of China‟s emergence as a global power.48  As China grows, there are 
expectations from other powers that it will assume a greater role in managing international crises 
and conflicts.  Constructive engagement with civilian protection issues – through increased 
Chinese contributions to UN peace-keeping missions - is a key aspect of China‟s attempts to 
promote its image as a “responsible great power”.49  Although peacekeeping action carried out 
with the consent of a host state must be distinguished from non-consensual military intervention 
under R2P‟s third pillar, China‟s increasing involvement in the former is evidence of its growing 
voice on civilian protection issues.   
 
Collectively, the three factors noted here contributed to China‟s shift towards a more 
accommodating stance on R2P in the period up to the Libyan intervention.  However, as 
discussed, cautious Chinese support for R2P was based on a narrow interpretation of the concept 
which prioritised prevention and state capacity building carried out with host state consent. 
R2P‟s potential to give rise to non-consensual military intervention remained a significant source 
of concern for China.  Prior to the Libyan crisis, it was assumed that China would not 
                                               
44 Dan GRIFFITHS, “China‟s balancing act over Darfur” BBC News (17 May 2007). online: BBC 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6665983.stm>. 
45 Chengqui WU, “Sovereignty, Human Rights and Responsibility: Changes in China‟s Response to International 
Humanitarian Crises” (2010) 15 Journal of Chinese Political Science 71 at 92. 
46 Prantl and Nakano, supra note 21 at 213-14. 
47 Pang, supra note 30 at 246. This was recently illustrated by China‟s massive evacuation of 32,000 of its citizens 
from Libya as the crisis unfolded.  
48
 See generally Michael FULLILOVE, “China and the United Nations: The Stakeholder Spectrum” (2011) Summer 
The Washington Quarterly 63. 
49 For more on China and peacekeeping see Chin-Hao HUANG, “Principles and Praxis of China‟s Peacekeeping” 
(2011) 18 International Peacekeeping 257; Courtney RICHARDSON, “A Responsible Power? China and the UN 
Peacekeeping Regime” (2011) 18 International Peacekeeping 286; Jing CHEN, “Explaining the Change in China‟s 
Attitude toward UN Peacekeeping: a norm change perspective” (2009) 18 Journal of Contemporary China 157. 
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countenance military intervention for humanitarian purposes unless host state consent could be 
obtained. 
 
III. R2P AND THE LIBYAN CRISIS 
 
The principle of R2P played a central role in framing the international community‟s response to 
the situation that developed in Libya in February 2011.
50
  This was reflected in the language used 
by the Security Council throughout the crisis.  First, following the Gaddafi regime‟s initial 
violent crackdown on protesters the Security Council issued a statement in which it explicitly 
“called on the Government of Libya to meet its responsibility to protect its population”.51  
Second, on 26 February 2011 the Council unanimously adopted resolution 1970 under Chapter 
VII of the Charter, again expressly noting R2P by “recalling the Libyan authorities‟ 
responsibility to protect its population”.52  Acting in accordance with article 41 of the Charter 
this resolution imposed an arms embargo and other restrictions on travel and Libyan assets, as 
well as referring the situation to the International Criminal Court.  Finally, and most 
dramatically, on 17 March 2011 the Security Council passed resolution 1973, with ten 
affirmative votes and abstentions from China, Russia, Brazil, India and Germany.
53
  This 
established a no-fly zone and authorised member states to take “all necessary measures to protect 
civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack” while “excluding a foreign 
occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory”.54  Once again, R2P was explicitly 
mentioned: resolution 1973 reiterated “the responsibility of the Libyan authorities to protect the 
Libyan population”.  Shortly after the passage of the resolution a coalition of states under NATO 
control began military action against Libyan targets. 
   
The Security Council‟s action on Libya was unprecedented in two important respects.55  
First, it represented the first time the Council had authorised the use of force for civilian 
protection purposes against the wishes of a host state.  This authorisation was crucial because it 
                                               
50 For a detailed account of events leading up to NATO‟s military intervention in Libya see Paul D. WILLIAMS, 
“Briefing: The Road to Humanitarian War in Libya” (2011) 3 Global Responsibility to Protect 248. 
51 Security Council Press Statement on Libya, UN Doc. SC/10180 (2011). 
52 SC Res. 1970, UN Doc. S/RES/1970 (2011). 
53 UN Doc. S/PV.6498 (2011). 
54 SC Res. 1973, UN Doc. S/RES/1973 (2011). 
55 Welsh, supra note 28 at 1. 
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provided a clear legal basis for the initiation of military action.
56
  Second, the speed with which 
concrete international action was taken was remarkably rapid by Security Council standards.   At 
first glance these two features may be seen as promising signs of the international community‟s 
ability to respond decisively to humanitarian emergencies.  However, closer examination 
suggests that a highly unusual, perhaps exceptional, confluence of factors produced a “perfect 
storm” in relation to the implementation of R2P in Libya.57    
 
The first key factor which influenced international action on Libya was the clarity and 
immediacy of the threat to the civilian population.
58
  The risk of mass atrocity crimes was clearly 
identified by senior UN officials during February and March 2011, and crystallised as Gaddafi 
forces surrounded the town of Benghazi.  It was subsequently confirmed by Gaddafi‟s own 
statements that “officers have been deployed in all tribes and regions so that they can purify all 
decisions from these cockroaches”, and that “any Libyan who takes arms against Libya will be 
executed”.59 Such explicit threats of violence were highly unusual but created a clear and urgent 
need for international action. 
 
A second important factor was the defection of members of the Gaddafi government.  
Several prominent figures, including Libya‟s ambassador to the UN, condemned the violence 
against protesters and called on the Security Council to deliver a “decisive, rapid and courageous 
resolution”.60  These defections contributed to Gaddafi‟s isolation and increased pressure on the 
international community to take action. 
 
                                               
56 Separate questions over the legality of NATO‟s use of force arose later in relation to the scope of the mandate in 
resolution 1973. See Mehrdad PAYANDEH, “The United Nations, Military Intervention, and Regime Change in 
Libya” (2012) 52 Virginia Journal of International Law 355; Donald ROTHWELL, “Responsibility to protect, not 
reason to invade” The Drum Opinion (21 April 2011), online: The Drum <www.abc.net.au/unleashed/97706.html>. 
57 The term “perfect storm” in relation to the Libyan intervention was used by Tim Dunne, “Libya and R2P: Norm 
consolidation or perfect storm?” The Interpreter (14 April 2011), online: The Interpreter 
<www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2011/04/15/Libya-R2PA-perfect-storm-.aspx>;  “Libya and R2P: A perfect storm?” 
The Interpreter (15 April 2011), online: The Interpreter <www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2011/04/15/Libya-R2PA-
Norm-consolidation-or-perfect-storm.aspx>. 
58 Bellamy and Williams, supra note 3 at 838-39. 
59 “Defiant Gaddafi issues chilling call” Australian Broadcasting Corporation (23 February 2011), online: ABC 
<http://www.abc.net.au/worldtoday/content/2011/s3146582.htm>. 
60 AFP, “Libyan ambassador jolts UN into action” The Age (26 February 2011), online: The Age  
<http://www.theage.com.au/world/libyan-ambassador-jolts-un-into-action-20110226-1b92k.html>. 
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The third, and most crucial, factor which provided the impetus for military action in 
Libya was the presence of regional consensus on the need for external intervention.
61
  Gaddafi‟s 
unpopularity in the Arab world meant that the Arab League, the Gulf Cooperation Council and 
the Organisation of the Islamic Conference all condemned the violence in Libya and suspended 
Libya from those organisations.  This was followed on 12 March 2011 by the Arab League 
passing a resolution which expressly called for a no-fly zone to protect civilians.
62
  Although the 
African Union (AU) was opposed to international intervention there was support from the 
Security Council‟s three African members, Nigeria, Gabon and South Africa.  This regional 
consensus was the “political game-changer”, which “fram[ed] the issues and defin[ed] the range 
of feasible international action”.63 As discussed in part IV, this factor was particularly influential 
in relation to China‟s decision to allow the passage of resolution 1973. 
 
The combined effect of these three factors was that China, Russia and the other BRIC 
members (Brazil and India) of the Security Council who retained misgivings about using force in 
Libya were boxed in.  Given the gravity and immediacy of the threat to civilians, blocking a 
resolution would have attracted significant criticism and damaged their international reputations.  
Faced with those consequences China, Russia, Brazil, India and Germany decided to abstain 
from voting on resolution 1973.  Bellamy and Williams conclude that these states “abstained 
because they believed that they could not legitimize inaction in the face of mass atrocities”.64  In 
this regard, although passage of resolution 1973 provided a clear legal basis for the initiation of 
military action against Libya, under the surface there remained divisions between Security 
Council members over R2P. 
 
These R2P fault-lines are evident from the wording of the Security Council‟s resolutions 
and statements on Libya. While both Security Council resolutions and the earlier press statement 
expressly noted Libya’s responsibility to protect, it is significant that none specifically mentioned 
the international community’s responsibility (though such a responsibility is assumed or 
implied).  Despite the Libyan crisis appearing to present a textbook case of a state “manifestly 
                                               
61
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63 Bellamy and Williams, supra note 3 at 841. 
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failing to protect its population” it seems that the international community remained 
uncomfortable with explicitly affirming its own responsibility to protect under R2P‟s third pillar.  
This reluctance was most likely based on fears that such an acknowledgement might imply the 
existence of a legal obligation to take similar action in future cases concerning mass atrocities.  
Welsh interprets this omission from resolution 1973 as an indication “that the latter notion [of 
the international community’s responsibility] was still contested by some members of the 
Security Council as an appropriate rationale for military action”.65  This suggests an 
unwillingness to lay down explicit markers which would establish Libya as a precedent for 
R2P‟s third pillar. In this respect, the Security Council‟s resolutions on Libya do not represent as 
complete an endorsement of R2P as some of the principle‟s advocates might have hoped for.   
 
IV. CHINA AND R2P IN THE LIBYAN CRISIS 
 
Close examination of China‟s engagement with R2P in the lead-up to NATO‟s intervention in 
Libya does not reveal any normative shift towards greater acceptance of the concept.  Although 
China supported resolution 1970 and allowed the passage of resolution 1973, these decisions 
were prompted by the unusual set of political and factual considerations discussed in part III, 
rather than by any softening of Chinese resistance to R2P‟s third pillar.  This is the clear message 
that emerges from China‟s explanation of the reasons for its abstention from voting on resolution 
1973. 
 
In explaining its decision to abstain, China offered a number of statements which 
suggested continuity, rather than change, in its approach to R2P and intervention more broadly.  
First, China‟s declarations that it “is always against the use of force”, and had “serious difficulty 
with parts of the resolution”, were a clear indication that it was opposed to non-consensual 
military intervention in Libya.
66
  Consistent with its traditional rhetorical emphasis on the non-
use of force, China‟s preference was for resolution of “the current crisis in Libya through 
peaceful means”.67  Second, China stressed that it “attaches great importance to the relevant 
position by the 22-member Arab League... [and] to the position of African countries and the 
                                               
65 Welsh, supra note 28 at 1.  
66 UN Doc S/PV.6498 (2011), at 10. 
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African Union”.68  This express acknowledgement of the crucial influence of regional players 
was in keeping with China‟s broader strategy of seeking to avoid international isolation on 
questions relating to international peace and security.  It also lends weight to Bellamy‟s and 
Williams‟ suggestion that regional organizations have become “gatekeepers” on civilian 
protection: their positions on a particular situation can either facilitate or prevent consensus 
within the Security Council.
69
  A third statement of note in China‟s explanation of its abstention 
was a reference to the “special circumstances surrounding the situation in Libya”.70  This pointed 
to a deliberate Chinese strategy of emphasising the unique nature of the crisis in order to avoid 
Libya being viewed as a precedent for future civilian protection operations.  Overall, China‟s 
explanation of its abstention from voting on 17 March 2011 revealed serious misgivings about 
resolution 1973, indicating a continuation of its previous cautious position on R2P. 
 
China‟s subsequent sharp criticism of the manner in which NATO‟s military campaign 
has been carried out suggested that the Libyan crisis may, in fact, lead to a hardening of Chinese 
resistance to R2P, at least in the short term.  Three separate lines of criticism emerged.  First, 
almost immediately after military action in Libya began China expressed concerns over civilian 
casualties caused by NATO bombing and called for an immediate ceasefire.
71
  This initial 
ground for criticism later gave way to a second area of concern: the interpretation of resolution 
1973.
72
  As the extent of NATO‟s military campaign became apparent, China and the other 
BRIC states accused Western powers of exceeding the mandate provided by the resolution.  
Instead of limiting the use of force to the protection of civilians, as required under the resolution, 
NATO‟s targeting of the Gaddafi government and provision of arms to rebel forces was 
perceived as an attempt at regime change.  In response to these concerns China stressed the need 
for a “complete and strict implementation of the relevant resolutions of the Security Council”.73  
Chinese fears that R2P could be used to disguise ulterior motives were expressed more explicitly 
later in the Security Council‟s May 2011 thematic debate on the protection of civilians in armed 
conflict: there, China bluntly warned that “[t]here must be no attempt at regime change ... under 
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70 UN Doc S/PV.6498 (2011), at 10. 
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72 See Payendeh, supra note 56 at 29-36. 
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the guise of protecting civilians”.74  A third line of criticism appeared to question even whether 
R2P was applicable to the Libyan situation.  In an apparent return to a more rigid interpretation 
of the principle of non-intervention, China expressed its disapproval of “involvement in civil war 
by any party” and stated that the “internal affairs and fate of Libya must be left up to the Libyan 
people to decide”.75  Although China acknowledged that “[t]he responsibility to protect civilians 
lies first and foremost with the Government of the country concerned” it did so as a warning 
against outside interference under R2P‟s third pillar, rather than as a reaffirmation of its support 
for R2P.
76
  These three lines of criticism have been used by China and other non-Western states 
as part of a strategy of questioning the legitimacy of the Libyan intervention.  Viewed together, 
they indicate that NATO‟s military action in Libya has reignited long-standing fears among 
some states that R2P could be relied on by Western powers as a pretext for the removal of 
unfriendly governments.   
 
The May 2011 Security Council debate on the protection of civilians offered two 
additional signs that the Libyan experience might trigger renewed Chinese efforts to contain 
R2P‟s normative development. The first emerged from China‟s comment that “conflict situations 
vary, and there must be no one-size-fits-all approach to the protection of civilians”.77  This was a 
further illustration of China‟s deliberate efforts to downplay the significance of the Libyan 
intervention as a precedent for international responses to other crises.  The second key feature of 
China‟s strategy was an attempt to influence the manner and pace at which R2P is articulated and 
implemented within the UN system.  This was evident from China‟s pointed reminder to the 
Security Council that “[v]arious parties still hold divergent views on the responsibility to protect, 
and the General Assembly should continue its discussion on this matter”.78  By calling for further 
consideration of R2P to be carried out within the General Assembly, China was seeking to slow 
the development of the concept and reduce the Security Council‟s potential to operationalize 
R2P in other civilian protection situations.  China‟s overall strategy of constraining R2P‟s 
implementation has been a central factor in the international community‟s failure to agree on 
steps to address violence in Syria in the post-Libya period. 
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V. R2P AND SYRIA  
 
The international community‟s inability to agree over an appropriate response to violence against 
pro-democracy demonstrators in Syria provides a marked contrast to its swift, decisive 
intervention in Libya.  Several months of intense discussions between Security Council members 
have failed to produce agreement on collective action against the Assad government.  Much of 
the optimism surrounding R2P in the immediate aftermath of resolution 1973 on Libya has been 
replaced by a realisation that achieving international consensus on civilian protection measures 
will rarely be straightforward.
79
   
 
The crucial factor behind the lack of Security Council action against Syria has been 
Chinese and Russian opposition to collective measures against the Assad regime.
80
   Concerns 
over the way military intervention in Libya unfolded have prompted China and Russia to 
strongly resist Western proposals to respond to the violence in Syria.  This “blow-back” from the 
Libyan experience is most clearly illustrated by Chinese and Russian vetoes of two draft Security 
Council resolutions on Syria.  The first of the double vetoes came on 4 October 2011, when 
China and Russia blocked a proposed resolution sponsored by the UK, France, Germany and 
Portugal.
81
  Vetoes were cast despite the fact that the draft resolution was relatively weak: it 
merely condemned the ongoing violence and warned of possible sanctions against Syria if 
civilian casualties continued.
82
   
 
Statements made by Security Council members in the aftermath of the 4 October vote 
highlighted the extent of divisions between Western and non-Western states over appropriate 
civilian protection measures in Syria.  In explaining its decision to veto the draft resolution, 
China echoed its traditional opposition to intervention in states‟ internal affairs, and to the use of 
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forceful or confrontational approaches.  On the former, it emphasised the need for any Security 
Council action to comply with “the Charter of the United Nations and the principle of non-
interference in the internal affairs of States”.83 In relation to the latter, China stressed its belief 
that “under the current circumstances, sanctions or the threat thereof does [sic] not help to 
resolve the question of Syria and instead, may further complicate the situation”.84  While Chinese 
statements did not expressly refer to NATO‟s military action in Libya, Russia drew a direct link 
between concerns over R2P in the Libyan case and its opposition to the draft resolution on Syria.  
Moscow asserted that “[t]he international community is alarmed by statements that compliance 
with Security Council resolutions on Libya in the NATO interpretation is a model for the future 
actions of NATO in implementing the responsibility to protect”.85  Russia warned that it “is easy 
to see that today‟s “Unified Protector” model could happen in Syria” and that “[t]hese types of 
models should be excluded from global practices once and for all”.86   
 
Following the failure of the Arab League‟s observer mission to Syria, on 4 February 2012 
the Security Council voted on a second draft resolution.
87
 Again, China and Russia exercised 
their vetoes.  On this occasion “no” votes were cast despite the proposed resolution explicitly 
providing “that nothing in this resolution authorizes measures under Article 42 of the Charter”.88  
China and Russia were prepared to block the resolution despite it receiving support from all of 
the other thirteen Security Council members.  Interestingly, India and South Africa, which had 
abstained on the first Syria draft resolution in October 2011, both voted in favour of the second 
draft resolution.
89
 
 
China‟s comments after the second double veto contained similar language and themes to 
those used following the first failed resolution in October 2011.  Immediately after the Security 
Council vote, China justified its veto on the basis that any international action “should comply 
with the purposes and principles of the Charter” and that collective measures should not 
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“complicate the issue”.90  In addition, an explicit reference to Chinese concerns over the Libyan 
intervention appeared in the leading Communist party newspaper, the People‟s Daily, which 
declared that “Libya offers a negative case study. Nato abused the security council [sic] 
resolution about establishing a no-fly zone and directly provided firepower to one side in the 
Libyan war”.91 
 
Western states responded angrily to the vetoes by China and Russia.  Following the 
October 2011 vetoes the United States accused “some members of the [Security] Council of 
prevent[ing] us from taking a principled stand against the Syrian regime‟s brutal oppression of its 
people”.92  With some justification, France labelled it “a veto on principle, which means that it is 
a refusal of all Security Council resolutions against Syria”.93  Meanwhile, the UK expressed 
disappointment that the resolution had been blocked despite the fact that “[b]y including 
reference to Article 41 of the Charter, we made it clear that any further steps would be non-
military in nature”.94  Similar but even more vehement criticism was directed at Russia and 
China following the blocking of the second draft resolution in February 2012.
95
 
 
The Chinese and Russian decisions to veto the two draft resolutions on Syria were a clear 
diplomatic riposte to the West for what they perceive was NATO‟s use of R2P as a pretext for 
removing the Gaddafi regime.  As one analyst put it in the aftermath of the first failed resolution, 
the vetoes were Beijing and Moscow‟s way of saying we “will not fall for that trick again”.96  
Vetoes were cast even though the two draft resolutions represented “watered-down” versions of 
earlier proposals.  Neither text contained a trigger for automatic sanctions, nor was there any risk 
that they could open the door to military intervention.
97
  In blocking even the mere possibility of 
non-forcible action against Syria, the stance taken by China and Russia went beyond their 
traditional misgivings about R2P‟s military dimension.     
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 Concerns over the way R2P was implemented in Libya were clearly a major factor 
underpinning China‟s opposition to Security Council action on Syria.  However, there is an 
alternative perspective on why China blocked civilian protection measures in this situation. This 
suggests that Beijing‟s rejection of the two draft resolutions might reflect China‟s adherence to a 
very narrow interpretation of when the international community should become involved in 
civilian protection crises. According to this account, China may believe that because the Assad 
government has remained largely intact – unlike the Gaddafi regime which quickly fragmented – 
there is still a possibility that the Syrian state could restore stability and ensure civilian 
protection.
98
  In such circumstances, China may favour giving the state an opportunity to re-
establish security.  In Beijing‟s eyes, Security Council pressure on a state under strain would be 
counter-productive, as it has argued in relation to Syria. 
 
 It is unclear whether Beijing has, in fact, relied on the “intact state” perspective to draw a 
distinction between the Syrian and Libyan situations.  China has not expressly referred to this 
factor, though it might be possible to infer such a view from statements that the international 
community “should give peace a chance in Syria”.99  If China does subscribe to a very strict 
interpretation of “manifestly failing to protect” – the point at which the responsibility to protect 
passes from the host state to the international community - this would significantly narrow the 
scope and application of R2P‟s third pillar.  It would also represent a major difference between 
Chinese and Western interpretations of R2P.    
 
Overall, the international community‟s inability to agree on any collective action in Syria 
suggests that the Libyan model of robust intervention for civilian protection purposes is unlikely 
to be replicated in the near future.  Operationalization of R2P in Libya was made possible by an 
unusual alignment of political factors, rather than by a sudden normative shift in favour of the 
concept.  In fact, the immediate post-Libya backlash from China and several other non-Western 
states is evidence that R2P‟s potential to act as a guiding principle for the Security Council‟s 
responses to civilian protection crises has been undermined by the Libyan experience. 
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VI. CHALLENGES FOR R2P 
 
R2P faces a number of significant challenges in the aftermath of the Libyan intervention.  The 
first is managing the political fall-out from Libya.  The perception that NATO exceeded its 
mandate on Libya has given renewed weight to long-standing fears among non-Western states 
over R2P‟s potential to act as cover for regime change.  Brazil‟s recently released concept note 
on R2P warned that “[t]his perception may make it even more difficult to attain the protection 
objectives pursued by the international community”.100  In describing the current climate around 
R2P India‟s ambassador to the UN stated more bluntly that “Libya has given R2P a bad 
name”.101  Reassuring the BRIC states that R2P is about protecting civilians from mass atrocity 
crimes, as opposed to removing unfriendly governments, will be a key step in bolstering R2P‟s 
legitimacy.  A renewed diplomatic focus on R2P‟s less controversial aspects of prevention and 
state capacity building is a sensible strategy for R2P advocates to pursue in the short term.  
 
A second, closely related challenge lies in addressing fundamental conceptual and 
operational issues about the relationship between civilian protection and regime change.
102
  
Leaving aside specific questions over the way in which NATO interpreted its mandate on Libya, 
there is a need for general clarification of whether and if so, how R2P intervention to protect 
civilians from state-perpetrated violence can be carried out effectively without also resulting in 
the removal of that government.  One commentator has suggested that „[t]he demise of a regime 
responsible for the mass atrocities that trigger an R2P intervention is logically inevitable”.103  
Even strong supporters of R2P have acknowledged that third pillar military intervention will 
involve a blurring of the lines between civilian protection and other goals such as removal of 
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oppressive governments.
104
  Clarifying this vital issue of the relationship between civilian 
protection and other strategic goals is an urgent priority for R2P.   
 
To this end a renewed debate about criteria for the legitimacy of the use of force is 
needed.  The failure, thus far, to adopt any guidelines on Security Council decision-making in the 
humanitarian context has resulted in R2P‟s third pillar remaining largely indeterminate.  The 
absence of clear standards governing when and how the international community should respond 
means that civilian protection measures are “contingent on the will of the Security Council and 
this will is heavily contingent on political exigencies”.105  Security Council deadlock over Syria 
is a clear illustration of this deficiency.  In order to reduce the potential for politicisation to 
paralyse the Security Council the criteria suggested in the original ICISS report and in the 2004 
High Level Panel Report should be revisited.
106
  Reaching agreement among P5 members on a 
set of standards is by no means a straightforward task, but it will be a key step towards 
enhancing the Security Council‟s ability to respond to R2P situations in a timely and consistent 
manner.
107
 
 
A final challenge relates to the drafting and interpretation of Security Council mandates 
on civilian protection issues.
108
  Controversy over the scope of resolution 1973‟s mandate for the 
use of force in Libya is likely to complicate future negotiations between Security Council 
members over the text of resolutions.  From now on, China and the other BRIC states will almost 
certainly insist on clearer, stricter provisions governing the objectives, means and duration of any 
military intervention.
109
  Therefore, even in the event of broad agreement between states on the 
need for military action for civilian protection purposes it may be difficult to reach consensus on 
the specific wording of a resolution that would authorise such use of force.   
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These three challenges to R2P are unlikely to be resolved easily or quickly.  They 
represent significant fault-lines between Western powers and some non-Western states which 
threaten to stall R2P‟s normative development.  In the short term, at least, the prospect of 
consensus on further UN-authorised military interventions for civilian protection purposes seems 
slim.   
 
VII. CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
 
The international community‟s swift and decisive intervention in Libya initially raised hopes of a 
new era of cooperation on civilian protection.  However, closer examination of the Libyan case 
suggests it was the result of an unusual alignment of political factors, rather than a fundamental 
shift in states‟ attitudes which consolidates R2P‟s normative status.  Subsequent concerns over 
the way R2P was implemented in Libya appear to have confirmed the original suspicions of non-
Western states that the concept may be used as a pretext for regime change.  This has produced a 
“blow-back” effect in relation to Syria, which has undermined R2P‟s capacity to provide the 
impetus for international action on civilian protection issues.  Overall, Libya may be a case of 
“one step forward, two steps back” for R2P. 
 
For China specifically, the Libyan experience may signal the beginning of a third phase 
in Beijing‟s relationship with R2P, following its initial strong criticism, and then subsequent 
cautious endorsement of a conservative interpretation of the concept.  Judging by China‟s stance 
on Syria, this third stage will be characterised by strong resistance to attempts at further 
implementation of R2P.  China has already shown its willingness to exercise its veto by blocking 
proposals for civilian protection measures against the Assad regime.  Beijing‟s renewed concerns 
about R2P since the Libyan intervention are shared by a number of non-Western states, meaning 
Chinese efforts to constrain R2P‟s future implementation are likely to be firmly backed by those 
other states.  This support may allow China to pursue such a strategy without the risk of being 
isolated, and at a lower cost to its international reputation. 
 
The crucial question for the future of R2P‟s third pillar is whether the political, 
conceptual and operational challenges that have arisen in the aftermath of the Libyan 
intervention can be resolved.  While the current evidence suggests that divisions between 
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Western powers and some non-Western states over R2P are unlikely to disappear quickly, the 
principle has survived previous periods of strong resistance during its short history, and may do 
so again. 
  
